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INTRODUCTION
Past flight deck design practices used within the
U.S. commercial transport aircraft industry have been
highly successful in producing safe and efficient aircraft.
However, recent advances in automation have changed
the way pilots operate aircraft, and these changes make
it necessary to reconsider overall flight deck design.
Automated systems have become more complex and
numerous, and often their inner functioning is partially
or fully opaque to the flight crew.  Recent accidents and
incidents involving autoflight system mode awareness
(Dornheim, 1995) are an example.  This increase in
complexity raises pilot concerns about the
trustworthiness of automation, and makes it difficult for
the crew to be aware of all the intricacies of operation
that may impact safe flight.  While pilots remain
ultimately responsible for mission success, performance
of flight deck tasks has been more widely distributed
across human and automated resources.  Advances in
sensor and data integration technologies now make far
more information available than may be prudent to
present to the flight crew.
The proposed High Speed Civil Transport (HSCT)
will likely add new automated systems, even more
automation complexity, and new flight crew
information requirements.  For example, an external
vision system, which would combine sensor and data
base information to compensate for the absence of
forward windows in the flight deck, may include a
variety of options for minification/magnification,
sensor selection, aim point, decluttering, automatic
alerting, system enhancement of sensed objects for
better detection, eye points (map view vs. perspective
view), and synthetic flight path guidance and other
enhanced symbology.  This can add tremendous
complexity and information overload from the pilot's
perspective.  In addition, there are dozens of new flight
deck requirements that could create new flight crew
monitoring and interaction tasks, such as laminar flow
status, high-lift system configuration, radiation
monitoring, sonic boom management, center of gravity
management and supersonic/subsonic speed manage-
ment.  The related demands on the flight crew could
impact workload, situation awareness, and information
management.  Design issues concerning flight crew
authority, function allocation, and the role of the flight
crew and automated systems will also be magnified,
because current HSCT concepts may require mandatory
use of autothrottles for landing and automatic control of
other flight control surfaces to successfully implement
flight envelope protection.
Consequently, whether one is concerned with the
design of the HSCT, or a next generation subsonic
aircraft that will include technological leaps in
automated systems, basic issues in human usability of
complex systems will be magnified. These concerns
must be addressed, in part, with an explicit, written
design philosophy focusing on human performance and
systems operability in the context of the overall
flight crew/flight deck system (i.e., a crew-centered
philosophy).  This document provides such a phil-
osophy, expressed as a set of guiding design principles,
and accompanied by information that will help focus
attention on flight crew issues earlier and iteratively
within the design process.
The philosophy assumes that the flight crew will
remain an integral component of safe and efficient
commercial flight for the foreseeable future because
human skills, knowledge, and flexibility are required in
the operation of complex systems in an unpredictable
and dynamic environment.  The performance of the
overall flight crew/flight deck system depends on
understanding the total system, its human and
automated components, and the way these components
interact to accomplish the mission.  The philosophy,
therefore, seeks to elevate design issues associated with
the understanding of human performance and cooperative
performance of humans and automation to the same
level of importance as the past focus on purely
technological issues, such as hardware performance and
reliability.  It also seeks to elevate flight crew/flight
deck issues to the same level of importance given other
aircraft design areas, such as aerodynamics and structural
engineering.  The philosophy includes the view that
flight deck automation should always support various
pilot roles in successfully completing the mission.
Pilot roles can be defined in many ways, but the
philosophy suggests that it is important to identify
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2human roles which highlight and distinguish important
categories of design issues that can affect overall flight
crew/flight deck performance.  The roles defined here
are: pilots as team members, pilots as commanders,
pilots as individual operators, and pilots as flight deck
occupants.  The role of team member highlights design
issues that affect communication, coordination,
common functional understanding and resource
management.  The role of commander highlights design
issues that affect authority, responsibility and the
allocation of functions.  The role of individual operator
highlights traditional human factors design issues such
as workload, anthropometrics, task compatibility with
human strengths and limitations, and interface design.
The role of occupant highlights design issues such as
comfort, health, safety, and subsistence.  Design
principles are presented according to these pilot roles.
The full philosophy document (Palmer, Rogers,
Press, Latorella, & Abbott, 1995), of which this
conference paper is a brief overview, is Part 1 of a two-
part set.  The objective of Part 1 is to provide a
description of the philosophy at a level that is aimed
primarily toward design team managers.  It is intended
to: (1) establish a common perspective of crew-centered
design, and the ways that perspective can be  applied
within the design process; and (2) provide a framework
for organizing increasingly detailed flight deck
guidelines which are consistent with the principles and
philosophy statements.  Part 2 of the document set will
provide more detailed information on relevant design
guidelines, test and evaluation issues, recommendations
for how to apply the philosophy, and methods for
identifying and resolving conflicts among design
principles and among design guidelines.
The authors wish to acknowledge the substantial
contributions of the many participants involved in the
development and review of the philosophy, including
researchers at NASA Langley, NASA Ames, Boeing
Commercial Airplane Group, McDonnell-Douglas
Aerospace-West, and Honeywell.
DESIGN PROCESS
The process by which commercial flight decks are
designed is complex, largely unwritten, variable, and
non-standard.  The process is also strongly reliant on
the knowledge and experiences of individuals involved
in each program, which has meant that the application
of any philosophy to the design process has been
necessarily informal.  That said, Figure 1 is an attempt
to describe the design process and where we believe the
philosophy should have an impact.  Although Figure 1
is not intended to exactly represent the accepted design
process within any particular organization or program,
it represents (except for the application of the
philosophy) a composite flight deck design process
based on various design process materials that have been
generated within or provided to NASA's High-Speed
Research (HSR) program, and is meant to be descriptive
of accepted design practice.  The philosophy and its
impact are shown with double lines to illustrate that
this is prescriptive information based on the views of
the authors.
Some very important points need to be made
about where the philosophy affects the design process.
First, the philosophy should affect any step or stage of
the design process where design decisions are made.
Second, although the philosophy is most commonly
applied to "how to" decisions in selecting design
concepts that meet various requirements (i.e., the boxes
labeled “Initial Design Concepts” and “Final Integrated
Design”), crew issues can also affect the "what" of
design, that is, what the aircraft or the flight deck must
do, operationally or functionally.  While the number of
crew issues that can affect the operational and functional
"what" may be small compared to those that affect the
"how to," especially at the aircraft level, they are
important (especially those concerning the pilot role of
occupant).  It is also important to note that we believe
the philosophy has implications for the design process
itself.  For example, the philosophy emphasizes that
total flight crew/flight deck performance is more
important than performance of individual components,
suggesting that flight deck integration issues should be
addressed prior to, or in parallel with, development of
individual flight deck systems or components (e.g.,
synthetic vision system for the HSCT).  This is
contrary to the way flight decks are traditionally
designed, though we recognize that the inclusion of
integration issues before systems are completely
specified may be difficult.
Also, while the philosophy is currently limited to
principles addressing the flight deck as a product of
design, it could also include principles of the design
process.  For example, we could easily envision a
principle stating that flight deck design, particularly
issues pertaining to flight crew operability, should be
addressed as early as possible and with as many
resources as other aircraft design areas, such as
propulsion, structures, and noise.
THE PHILOSOPHY
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presented here begins with the explicit acknowledgment
that the flight crew, flight deck, and even the airplane
itself are only parts of a much larger commercial air
transportation system.  Other elements of this system
include the airlines and their flight dispatchers and
maintenance personnel, weather forecasters, airport
operators, air traffic controllers, and government
regulators.  Mission success is the overall goal, and it
depends upon the cooperation and performance of each
of these elements.  Within this context, however, the
philosophy contained in this document is limited to the
operation of the aircraft by the flight crew.  Because
human skills, knowledge and flexibility will continue
to be required to operate complex systems in the
dynamic and often unpredictable aviation environment,
flight deck design should be crew-centered in the sense
that it should support the flight crew in successfully
accomplishing the mission.
The crew-centered design philosophy espoused here
can be described in its simplest form with the following
set of Philosophy Statements, numbered as S-1 through
S-3:
S-1. Each design decision should consider overall
flight safety and efficiency.  Combined flight
crew/flight deck system performance is more
important than local optimization of the
performance of any human or automated
component in that system.
S-2. Overall flight crew/flight deck performance and
the performance of the human and automated
components are affected by qualitatively different
sets of issues depending on the specific
operational roles in which pilots are viewed.
Flight deck design should consider these different
roles.
S-3. Humans and machines are not comparable, they
are complementary (Jordan, 1963); that is, they
possess different capabilities, limitations,
strengths and weaknesses, and there is a mutual
dependence required between humans and
machines to successfully accomplish the
mission.  Safety and efficiency of flight will be
maximized by focusing on ways to develop and
support the complementary nature of the flight
crew and the flight deck systems.
This philosophy presented in the above statements
is discussed in the following sections, in terms of pilot
and automation roles, design principles, and issues
related to resolving conflicts among the principles.  The
organization of the principles is determined by the
various roles of the flight crew members, as described
below.  The pilot roles also influence the organization
of the categories of design guidance, as described in
Palmer, et al. (1995).
   Pilot Roles
The organizing scheme used for the generation and
presentation of the principles is based upon the role of
pilots as team members, commanders, individual
operators, and flight deck occupants.  These roles are
nested rather than independent.  That is, the pilot is
always an occupant, and is an operator while in the
roles of commander and team player.  Thus, there will
be some overlap in design issues related to the different
roles.  But we believe these roles highlight and
distinguish important categories of design issues that
can affect human performance and overall flight
crew/flight deck performance.
With the complex systems, technologies, and
operating environments that characterize modern
commercial aviation, how humans work with other
"agents," human and automated, (e.g., in communi-
cating, coordinating, and sharing functions) is a major
design issue.  Cockpit Resource Management (CRM)
evolved from the realization that problems in
communication and coordination among crew members
contributed to a large number of accidents and incidents.
Problems of communication and coordination do not
only occur between crew members; miscommunications
between flight crew and air traffic controllers have been
well documented in Aviation Safety Reporting System
incident reports.  Further, automation "surprises"
reflecting pilot misunderstanding of automated systems
such as the flight management system and autopilot
system are well documented (Sarter & Woods, 1992).
The team member role addresses these issues.  While
authority issues and the role of commander could be
covered under the role of team member, we felt it was
important to call it out separately because of the
significance of authority issues in defining the human-
centered philosophy.  There is strong consensus that the
pilot will continue to be ultimately responsible for safe
operation of the aircraft (e.g., Billings, 1991; Wilson &
Fadden, 1991), and this should be a primary driver of
function allocation decisions.  Supporting the pilot as
an individual operator is the primary focus of most
current human factors guidance -- design must account
for all that is known about how humans perform tasks.
The role of occupant was defined separately because it is
easy to forget that the design must support the pilot in
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peripheral tasks and pilot needs that must be supported
in the context of the pilot as a human occupying a
specific environment for a period of time.  Each of these
roles is described below:
Pilots as Team Members:  This reflects the role of
pilots as members of a team that includes not only
the other flight crew members, but also elements of
the flight deck automation, and in the larger
context, elements of a distributed system including
air traffic controllers, airline dispatch, regulatory
agencies, etc.  The issues involved include the need
for communication, coordination, and shared
functional understanding among all team members
to successfully accomplish tasks.
Pilots as Commanders:  This reflects the role of
each pilot, individually, as being directly
responsible for the success of the mission.  The
issues involved include the level of pilot authority
over the flight deck automation, and the ability of
the pilot to delegate tasks.
Pilots as  Individual Operators:  This reflects the
role of pilots as individual human operators
working within a complex system of controls and
displays.  The issues involved include many of the
traditional human factors disciplines such as
anthropometrics, control/display compatibility, and
cognitive processing.
Pilots as Occupants:  This reflects the role of the
pilots as living organisms within the flight deck
environment.  The issues involved include ingress
and egress capability, protection from the radiation
and atmospheric conditions at the expected cruise
altitudes, and accommodation of items such as food
and drink containers.
We believe that these roles represent distinctly different
design concerns and issues.  A major benefit of
organizing the guiding principles according to the pilot
roles identified above is that it serves as a bridge into
the supporting research literature on human factors and
flight deck design.  The pilot roles also serve as one of
the dimensions by which the design guidelines are
categorized.
    Automation Roles
As stated earlier, the philosophy suggests that
overall performance of the flight crew/flight deck
system is best served by prescribing that the sole
purpose of automation is to support specific roles of the
flight crew in accomplishing the mission.  In this
sense, the automation is always subservient to the
flight crew.  It may substitute for the pilot entirely in
conducting some functions and tasks, it may augment
the pilot by performing certain control actions, or it
may aid the pilot in the gathering and integration of
information.
    Design Principles
A fundamental purpose of constructing a set of
principles to represent a philosophy, is for these
principles to serve as practical guides and not merely
abstract concepts.  This document therefore strives to
present the principles in a form that will result in
consistent interpretations, even though this may result
in less elegance in phrasing.  The principles are listed
below according to the pilot roles described above, and
are numbered as PT-x, PC-x, PI-x, or PO-x, for
principles related to the roles of team member (PT),
commander (PC), individual operator (PI), or flight deck
occupant (PO).
   Pilots as Team Members
PT-1. The design should facilitate human operator
awareness of his or her responsibilities, and the
responsibilities of the other human operators
and automated flight deck systems, in fulfilling
the current mission objectives.
PT-2. The design should facilitate the communication
of activities, task status, conceptual models,
and current mission goals among the human
operators and automated flight deck systems.
PT-3. The design should support the dynamic
allocation of functions and tasks among
multiple human operators and automated flight
deck systems.
PT-4. The design should assure that team limitations
are not exceeded.
PT-5. Cooperative team capabilities (e.g.  use of
collective resources and cooperative problem
solving) should be used to advantage when
necessary.
PT-6. The design should minimize interference
among functions or tasks which may be
performed concurrently by multiple human
operators or automated flight deck systems.
5PT-7. The design should facilitate the prevention,
tolerance, detection, and correction of both
human and system errors, using the capa-
bilities of the human operators and the flight
deck automation.
   Pilots as Commanders
PC-1. The human operator should have final
authority over all critical flight functions and
tasks.
PC-2. The human operator should have access to all
available information concerning the status of
the aircraft, its systems, and the progress of the
flight.
PC-3. The human operator should have final
authority over all dynamic function and task
allocation.
PC-4. The human operator should have the authority
to exceed known system limitations when
necessary to maintain the safety of the flight.
   Pilots as Individual Operators
PI-1. The human operator should be appropriately
involved in all functions and tasks which have
been allocated to him or her.
PI-2. Different strategies should be supported for
meeting mission objectives.
PI-3. The content and level of integration of
information provided to the human operator
should be appropriate for the functions and
tasks being performed and the level of aiding or
automation being used.
PI-4. Methods for accomplishing all flight crew
functions and tasks should be consistent with
mission objectives.
PI-5. Procedures and tasks with common compo-
nents or goals should be performed in a
consistent manner across systems and mission
objectives.
PI-6. Procedures and tasks with different components
or goals should be distinct across systems and
mission objectives.
PI-7. The design should facilitate the development
by the human operator of conceptual models of
the mission objectives and system functions
that are both useful and consistent with reality.
PI-8. Fundamental human limitations (e.g.,
memory, computation, attention, decision-
making biases, task timesharing) should not be
exceeded.
PI-9. Fundamental human capabilities (e.g., problem
solving, inductive reasoning) should be used to
advantage.
PI-10. Interference among functions or tasks which an
operator may perform concurrently should be
minimized.
   Pilots as Flight Deck Occupants
PO-1. The needs of the flight crew as humans in a
potentially hazardous work environment should
be supported.
PO-2. The design should accommodate what is
known about basic human physical
characteristics.
PO-3. Peripheral activities which are indirectly related
to the mission objectives should be supported.
PO-4. The design should account for major cultural
norms.
    Conflict Resolution
Those involved in the flight deck design process
know that design decisions involve compromise.
Economic, regulatory, safety, and operational con-
straints continually conflict.  In the sense that human-
centered design principles and guidelines are design
constraints, they may conflict with other constraints,
such as market, regulatory, physical, etc.  More
important, at least within the scope of this philosophy,
is the fact that these principles and guidelines will
sometimes create conflicts among themselves when
design concepts and design decisions are being made.
We believe that a general priority order may exist
for classes of principles.  For example, those that
involve the pilot as team member may generally be
higher priority than those that involve the pilot as
commander, which may generally be more important
than those that involve the pilot as an individual
operator and so forth.  Fixed priorities may exist among
individual principles as well.  For example, principle
PI-1 states that the pilot should be appropriately
involved in all critical flight functions and tasks for
which he or she is responsible.  Yet in certain
conditions, this involvement may exceed the attentional
and information processing capacity of the pilot (a
violation of PI-8, i.e., fundamental human limitations
should not be exceeded).  Hence, one might argue that
PI-8 has a higher fixed priority than PI-1.
But in the final analysis, which principle or
guideline takes precedence over another in regard to
developing a specific design concept or making a
6specific design decision is usually context- and issue-
specific.  Therefore, methods and metrics are needed to
identify and resolve conflicts among principles and
guidelines.  A multi-disciplinary team is recommended
for resolving conflicts, rather than a single individual.
Where major differences of opinion occur, trade studies
might be appropriate to evaluate proposed design
solutions based on different priority weightings of
competing principles or guidelines.  Test and evaluation
will ultimately determine if the trade-offs that were
made during the design process were appropriate. Part 2
of the full design philosophy document will address the
issue of conflict resolution in greater detail.
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Figure 1.  Simplified representation of the flight deck design process and the impact of the design philosophy.
